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Abstract: It has been suggested that psychometrics is a pathological science on the basis 
that its normal processes prevent the attainment of its stated goal and conflicting interests 
prevent its constituents from acknowledging that this is the case.  This study addressed 
basic measurement concerns associated with self- and other-report personality measures 
that are not addressed under the prevailing psychometric for establishing psychometric 
validity.  Participants completed a series of pairwise comparisons (i.e., “more,” “less,” 
“equal”) of themselves and known others with respect to 13 NEO Neuroticism-domain 
constructs.  These judgments were examined for triplet transitivity; participants often 
made judgments that violated the condition of transitivity, suggesting that researchers are 
not justified in self- and other-ratings with respect to these attributes as ordinal or 
quantitative relations.  Participants also compared themselves and known others in a 
complex ranking procedures with respect to three broad-level definitions of Neuroticism 
that appear in the NEO literature.  Responses were examined for rank consistency across 
definitions.  Low rates of rank consistency across definitions suggest that these 
definitions are not practically synonymous among lay persons.  These studies do not 
prove that people cannot consistently order person with respect to Neuroticism-domain 
attributes, nor do they prove that multiple definitions of Neuroticism evoke different 
constructs for all people; however, in the absence of evidence that self- and other-ratings 
are ordinal and in the presence of evidence that they are often not ordinal, it is 
inappropriate to treat them as representations of rank or quantity.  Likewise, in the 
absence of demonstrations that multiple definitions of Neuroticism are practically 
synonymous to individual raters and in the presence of evidence that they are often not 
practically synonymous, it is inappropriate to use them interchangeably.   In brief, these 
are the kinds of measurement tasks that researchers need to engage in order to justify the 
measurement claims they are already making.  These methods are recommended for use 
in conjunction with conversations with raters as a means to confront and correct the 
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Psychometrics as a Pathological Science 
Joel Michell (e.g., 2000, 2008a, 2008b) suggests that an enterprise should be classified as 
pathological when its normal processes prevent the attainment of its stated aims and conflicting 
interests prevent its constituents from recognizing that this is the case.  He has also argued that 
psychometrics satisfies these criteria.  In the course of evaluating this claim, at least three broad 
questions should be asked of psychometrics:  1) what would it take to meet the goal of 
psychometrics? 2) Do the prevailing methods prevent the attainment of that goal? 3) If the answer to 
the former is affirmative, who benefits from maintaining the illusion that psychometrics is “on track?”  







REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
The Goal: Quantitative Measurement 
Michell calls psychometrics pathological on the grounds that a) the goal of psychometrics 
is the measurement of psychological characteristics, yet the characteristic methods of 
psychometrics merely assume that psychological attributes are measurable and b) that mainstream 
psychometricians have accepted this assumption as true in the absence of serious attempts to 
question it.   
In accordance with classical measurement theory, he defines measurement as “the 
estimation or discovery of the ratio of some magnitude of a quantitative attribute to a unit of the 
same attribute,” (Michell, 1997, p. 358), where an attribute is a range of properties or relations 
that may vary from instance to instance, and a quantitative attribute is a range of properties or 
relations that admits infinite degrees of variation in magnitude (Ellis, 1996; Michell, 1990; 
Trendler, 2009).  According to this view of measurement, numbers or values are relations that 
obtain between real things; more specifically, numbers are faithful representations of magnitudes 
of quantitative attributes possessed by real things.   
Quantitivity	  
Quantitative properties or attributes are variables that meet conditions of ordinal, additive and 




vary” (Barrett, 2003, p. 423). The axiomatic conditions of quantitative structure as outlined by 
J.S. Mill (1843/1974) and later by Hölder (1901) are as follows:   
Let X, Y and Z by any three values of variable Q.  Variable Q satisfies the conditions of 
quantitative structure if and only if:  
1) X ≥ Y and Y ≥ Z then X ≥ Z (transitivity; this extends to X < Y < Z);  
2) X ≥ Y and Y ≤ X then X = Y (antisymmetry); 
3) either X ≥ Y or Y ≥ X (strong connexity); 
Let Variable Q be any ordinal variable such that for any of its values X, Y and Z: 
4) X + (Y + Z) = (X + Y) + Z (associativity); 
5) X + Y = Y + X (commutativity); 
6) X ≥ Y if and only if X + Y ≥ Y + Z (monotonicity); 
7) If X > Y then there exists a value of Z such that X = Y + Z (solvability); 
8) X + Y > Z (positivity); 
9) There exists a natural number n such that nXY ≥ Y (where 1X = X and (n+1)X = nX + 
X) (the Archimedian or continuity condition). 
 
Axioms 1-3 describe the conditions of ordinal structure; an attribute with ordinal 
structure permits variation in magnitude (i.e., “more” or “less”).  Axioms 1- 6 describe the 
conditions of additivity; magnitudes of an attribute with additive structure can be stated as 
quantities of a common unit.  Magnitudes of attributes with additive structure can be 
meaningfully combined (e.g., 2 + 3 = 5 only where 2 = two units of an attribute and 3 = three 
units of the same attribute).  The final condition of quantitivity is the Archimedian condition, 
which establishes continuity; continuous attributes are those for which there is no limit to the 
smallness of the units into which they may be divided.  Length, for example, is a continuous 
attribute as length may theoretically be divided infinitely.  Discrete attributes on the other hand, 
are indivisible units (e.g., a “quantity” of people must always be a positive integer because half of 
a person, for example, is not a person.)   
Under the classical measurement paradigm, variable properties satisfying all nine 
conditions are, in principle, measurable as for any values a and b of Q, the magnitude of a 
relative to b may be expressed as a positive real number (i.e., a may be stated in terms of units b).  
The length of a single object, for example, is stated relative to an arbitrary unit of length (e.g., the 
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length a of a yardstick may be stated as a ratio of units of inches b in, such that a = 36b.)  The 
relative magnitudes of two objects with respect to length may be stated as a ratio of their 
respective magnitudes of length (e.g., 36 inches = 3*12 inches, or 1 inch = 1/3 * 36 inches).  
Measurability extends to relations between magnitudes of two or more attributes that are 
quantitatively related.  Density, for example, is equal to a ratio of mass, a quantitative attribute, to 
units of volumes, also a quantitative attribute; therefore, the density of any object may be stated in 
terms of the density of any other object (e.g., the gm/cm3 of lead = .15 gm/cm3 of magnesium or 
the gm/cm3 of magnesium = 6.647 gm/cm3 of lead).   
Michell (e.g., 2008a, 2008b) is adamant that, in a scientific context, the term 
“measurement” properly applies solely to the assessment of quantity (i.e., continuous quantities).  
To date, no psychological attribute has been demonstrated to have quantitative structure; if we 
accept the definition of measurement as the estimation or discovery of magnitudes of quantity, 
without discounting their statistical elegance, any claim that psychometric modeling techniques 
produce measurements of psychological attributes is misleading.  Michell is by no means the first 
to make this charge against psychometrics.  In the 1930’s, the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science established the Ferguson committee, which included noted physicist and 
measurement theorist Norman Robert Campbell, to investigate whether psychological attributes 
satisfied the conditions of quantitative measurability, and by implication the viability of a field of 
psychometrics.  In its final report the committee determined that, in the absence of empirical 
demonstrations that ratings of psychological attributes could sustain concatenation operations 
(i.e., conditions of additivity), psychological attributes could not be considered scientifically 
measureable (Ferguson et al., 1940).   
An Alternative Goal: Non-quantitative Measurement 
Psychologist and psychometrician S. S. Stevens responded to the committee’s report by 
challenging their definition of measurement as the estimation of quantities of units and ratios of 
quantities.  Admitting that psychometricians had not verified the quantitivity of psychological 
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attributes, he famously defended psychometrics by invoking an alternate definition of 
measurement, writing that: 
 
“…in dealing with the aspects of objects we can invoke empirical 
operations for determining equality (the basis for classifying things), for 
rank ordering, and for determining when differences and ratios between 
the aspects of objects are equal…This isomorphism between the formal 
system and empirical operations performed with material things justifies 
the use of a formal system as a model to stand for aspects of the 
empirical world” (1951, p. 23). 
 
In other words, measurement is the assignment of values to entities according to a 
consistent rule.  Representational measurement theory, grounded in Tarski’s metamathematics, 
particularly his general theory of models, holds that measurement is a homomorphism, or 
structure preserving map, between finite sets of elements in a particular relational system 
(Trendler, 2009; see Sher, 1999 for a review of Tarski’s work).  A relational system is purely 
formal, and the elements are abstract symbols.  If the elements are applied to empirical objects, 
the corresponding set of objects is referred to as an empirical relational system or an empirical 
structure.  When elements take the form of numbers, relations between the elements are expressed 
in mathematical terms; a relational system in which elements take the form of numbers is called a 
numerical relational system or a numerical structure.  Provided that the relations between a 
numerical structures and corresponding empirical structures are maintained, empirical relations 
may be studied in mathematical terms.  That is, mathematical operations performed on 
measurement values can serve as a proxy for in vivo operations performed on empirical systems. 
Under a representational measurement paradigm, inasmuch as a procedure estimates 
empirical relationships, it may be considered measurement. Quantitative measurement, then, is 
the representation of one among many empirical systems; that is, it is a model of formal 
relationships among elements with respect to quantity.  Many non-quantitative formal 
relationships holding between sets of entities may also be meaningfully represented by numerical 
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structures and mathematical operations performed on the values produced by non-quantitative 
measurement procedures can also serve as a proxy for in vivo operations performed on empirical 
systems, provided that the operations performed on the values do not disrupt their 
representational status.    
Stevens outlined four scales of measurement:  nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio.  From 
a representational measurement perspective, nominal scales are a form of measurement as they 
represent formal relations among a group of entities with respect to a particularly category.  For 
example, provided that some rule exists for determining “redness,” most physical objects may be 
classified in relation to one another using a dichotomous scale of red = 1, not red = 0.  Nominal 
scales are the basis for all measurement scales, in part because they identify sets of entities that 
may be further classified with respect to a common attribute (e.g., we do not measure length in 
things that do not satisfy the criterion of possessing length).  Estimation of ordinality also 
constitutes measurement as ordinal values preserve formal relations between objects with respect 
to rank magnitudes of a common attribute.  Interval and ratio scales both preserve formal 
relations between objects with respect to magnitude of quantity, although interval quantities are 
stated with respect to an arbitrary zero and ratio quantities are stated with respect to an absolute 
zero.  Stevens also outlined the statistical operations that could be meaningfully applied to values 
representing each type of relational system or “level of measurement.” 
The Stumbling Blocks 
Psychometric “Validity” 
Provided that measurement refers solely to the estimation or discovery of quantity, the 
field of psychometrics as that field whose project is the measurement of psychological attributes 
has failed to reach or even to strive for its goal.  Several theories provide theoretical means of 
quantifying and demonstrating the quantitivity of attributes that cannot sustain concatenation 
operations (e.g., conjoint measurement theory, e.g., Luce & Tukey, 1964; item response theory, 
see Borsboom & Mellenbergh, 2004), but as they fail a) to identify the nature of the empirical 
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system targeted for quantification and b) are generally applied to observed data with unknown 
representational value, they may be considered distractions from rather than solutions to the 
fundamental problem of psychological measurement.   
At the risk of offending those who believe that the term measurement applies solely to 
estimation or discovery of quantities, I submit that the goal of psychometrics is the accurate 
representation of relative relations of individual entities with respect to psychological attributes 
and emphasize that this includes but is not limited to the representation of quantitative relations 
where they are claimed or assumed.  Though inconsistent with Michell’s definition of 
psychological measurement, this is consistent with his concern that the term “measurement” 
evokes quantitative relations and is, thus, misleading when it is used in reference to the estimation 
of non-quantitative relations (2008b). 
 The charge that psychometrics is pathological is not made inapplicable by the adoption 
of a representational measurement paradigm.  If anything, the lens of representational 
measurement theory brings the pathological nature of prevailing psychometric practices into 
focus more clearly as it emphasizes the standard of measurement validity as representational 
accuracy with respect to a particular empirical system; from this perspective, error is meaningful 
solely in reference to a target.  In order, then, to attain the goal of psychometrics, psychological 
measurement procedures must correspond to a target empirical system and the values produced 
by them should be used in full knowledge of what that target is.  For example, if a scale is 
intended to produce ordinal relations of individuals with respect to attribute A, then the validity of 
the scale should be determined solely by its ability to do so, and neither the operations applied to 
the values produced by the scale nor interpretations of analyses carried out using scale values 
should disrupt their representational validity.  The same standards should apply to procedures 
designed to represent individual magnitudes in relation to units of a quantitative attribute, ordinal 
group relations with respect to an attribute, and so on.  That is, the standard must be specified and 
respected.  Failure to do so carries with it the potential of poor science, the abuse of the public’s 
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trust in psychometrics and those who employ psychological scales in their research, and the very 
real possibility that the misinterpretation of research that relies on the validity of psychometric 
procedures will contribute to societal harm (e.g., misallocation of public or private funds, 
unjustified loss of employment/promotion, etc.)   
Under the prevailing psychometric practices, the validity of psychological measurement 
scales is judged largely by whether the values it produces are statistically correlated in the 
anticipated direction and degree with values produced by other psychological measurement, by 
inter-item correlations, etc.  This is inappropriate provided that a scale is meant, for example, to 
order individuals—or even individual groups- with respect to some attribute and that the values 
produced by scale administration are treated as if it does.  As long as standard practices used to 
vet psychometric procedures allow us to conclude that a measurement procedure is valid (i.e., that 
it measures what it intends to measure) in the absence of a) a clear statement as to the empirical 
system it is intended to represent (e.g., ordinal relations of entities with respect to a named 
attribute) and b) empirical evidence that it succeeds in doing so (e.g., at the very least, values 
assigned to each entity should be shown to satisfy the expectation of whatever relation is claimed, 
be it ordinal, quantitative, etc.), one can confidently state that the prevailing psychometric 
paradigm does not simply fail to attain its goal, but actively stands in the way of its attainment.  
These statements reflect only a brief and practical assessment of the current state of 
psychometrics.  It is certainly possible to delve deeper into the question of what the goal of 
psychometrics is or should be according to psychometricians—and Michell (e.g., 2008b) does, 
but as the products of psychometrics are so widely used and the results of their use so influential 
in our systems of government, education, industry, etc., I submit that there is no need to go deeper 
to conclude that something is rotten in the state of psychometrics. 
Conflicting Interests 
If psychometric procedures and practices do not and cannot do what we claim and/or 
believe them to do, why do we persist in using them?  According to Michell (2000), the pressure 
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of scientism in the 19th century led psychologists to adopt and advance the rhetoric of 
measurement, and continuing pressures have prevented psychologists from acknowledging the 
resulting methodological shortcomings.  One of the pressures he cites is the economic reliance of 
scientific research on grants from agencies that award financial support based upon apparent 
methodological rigor.  Michell points out that the “new rigorism movement” in psychology 
emerged during the immediate post-WWII decades when government investment in scientific 
research was on the rise, and that our methods have remained largely unchanged since that time.   
Psychology historian Kurt Danziger (1990) has presented a similar narrative of what he 
refers to as “the triumph of the aggregate” (p. 68).  Prior to WWI, almost all of the published 
results in journals of experimental psychology were attributed to individual subjects; even in 
cases where responses were averaged across individuals, individual responses were generally 
provided and interpretations were usually based on these individual patterns of responses.  During 
the period from WWI to WWII, the ratio of studies reporting individual data to aggregate data 
rapidly declined, particularly in journals geared towards “applied psychology.”  Danziger makes 
the case that this shift may be attributed to the higher marketability of aggregate studies relative 
to studies of individuals as a proposed means to assess and improve social conditions.   
Both Michell (2000) and Barrett (2008) suggest that, having succeeding for so long in 
presenting psychology as a quantitative science, psychologists have become increasingly invested 
in preserving the appearance of measures of psychological phenomena.  Psychologists are by no 
means alone in this investment. The increased focus on aggregate analyses may not at first glance 
appear to stand in the way of the pursuit of valid measurements, as even aggregate analyses 
presume the valid representation of individuals within a specified system.  As with any product, 
however, once pseudo-measurement procedures had been marketed to the public (i.e., a client-
base has been identified), their creators, marketers and users can easily find themselves colluding 
to defend their worth.  
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Widespread acknowledgment that the field of psychometrics has gone off plot would 
have equally widespread consequences because it would call for a reevaluation of its products, 
which have been disseminated into almost every aspect of society.  Researchers do not want to 
question the foundations of years of work, government agencies do not want to hear that they 
spent millions of dollars on so-called scientific procedures that turned out to be no more than a 
“bad tip;” the list could go on and on.  The debate over whether or in what sense psychological 
attributes are measurable has inspired countless books, journal articles, etc., many of which are 
confusing to initiates into psychology and/or measurement theory and most of which are likely 
impenetrable to members of the general public; yet a child knows that four apples is twice as 
many as two apples, while psychologists regularly ignore the importance of demonstrating that a 
person who obtains a score of 10 on a so-called quantitative measure of self-esteem should have 
twice as much self-esteem as a person who obtains a score of 5. Could it be that there are many 
and varied forces preventing educated psychologists from focusing on the most basic 
requirements of psychological measurement?    
Confronting Our Own Pathology 
 Michell has proposed that psychometrics is pathological because its normal processes 
prevent the attainment of its stated aims and conflicting interests prevent its constituents from 
recognizing that this is the case.  I concur with Michell, but submit that psychometrics has not 
failed to attain its goal by failing to demonstrate that psychological attributes are measurable in 
the sense that they are quantitative, but by failing to demonstrate that psychological measurement 
procedures are valid representations of any empirical system quantitative or otherwise.  I also 
submit that, because psychometric practices and procedures are being applied by decreasingly 
specialized persons, the number of people who should be labeled constituents of the field of 
psychometrics goes well beyond those designated as “psychometricians” to include practitioners 
of its products and procedures (e.g., psychological researchers who follow accepted standards to 
design “measures” of psychological attributes).  That is, the health of psychometrics should not 
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be judged solely at the level of the writings and beliefs of measurement specialists—not to say 
that the final diagnosis would differ-but also at the level of application.  
 If prevailing psychometric practices are pathological, what is the cure?  A good first step 
is to acknowledge that psychometricians have not “filled the position” of answering basic 
measurement issues.   The statistical procedures associated with psychometrics may be of great 
worth provided that they are applied to valid measurement values.  Consider, for example, Bayes 
formula for calculating the probability of X given Y:  If we know the true and false positive rates 
of a test for Disease X and the rate at which Disease X occurs in a population, we can calculate 
the conditional probability that a person who tests positive on the test actually has Disease X.  
Before we can apply this formula, however, we have to establish what it means to have Disease 
X; that is, the test helps us estimate something that is knowable in another way.  While such a test 
may be more feasible than the path to concrete knowledge (e.g., perhaps 100% certainty requires 
a postmortem procedure), it does not replace the basic measurement task of clarifying the 
essential characteristics of the target state.  The current study is offered as an example of some 
basic measurement tasks that must be fulfilled if we are to claim that we are measuring 
psychological attributes.  The criticisms and methods outlined here are applicable to any number 
of psychological phenomena, but this particular study addresses a measurement claim that is 
made by personality trait theorists; namely, that we can and regularly do measure personality. 
Measuring Personality 
From the perspective of trait theory, personality is understood as a collection of 
observable patterns of behaviors (i.e., “traits”) that are attributable to a finite set of underlying 
structures—also referred to as “traits”-the latter of which are characterized by the production of 
forces that motivate engagement in category-specific behaviors (e.g., agreeableness, 
extraversion).  Most if not all of the personality differences we observe from one individual to 
another are believed to be produced by different combinations of values along quantitative trait-
dimensions that are applicable to all people.  As traits are considered to be quantitative attributes 
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possessed by individuals, one would expect a trait-measure to produce values that represent 
individual magnitudes of an identified trait-unit (e.g., a unit of motivational force specifically 
directed towards a class of trait-relevant behaviors if the target system is that of individuals with 
respect to underlying structures; a ratio of trait-relevant behaviors to all behaviors or to behaviors 
that are specific to a single trait-dimension if the target system is that of individuals with respect 
to traits as observable patterns of behavior); this, however, is not the case.   
Trait-measures generally consist of a series of items in which people are asked to rank or 
rate the self and/or others with respect to typical behavior or personal attributes, also referred to 
as “traits” on the assumption that the language we use to describe ourselves is a valid indicator of 
actual behavior.  For example, people are believed to be called “kind”- a natural language trait—
because they engage in many “kind” behaviors and, perhaps, few “unkind” behaviors, and a 
person who engages in more “kind” acts than another is described as “kinder” than him/her.  That 
is, trait scales are intended to represent empirical magnitudes or proportions of behaviors. 
Trait models of personality rely heavily on the use of factor analysis, which have been 
embraced as a means both to uncover and measure individual relations with respect to latent 
quantitative structures that underlie variation in patterns of behaviors.  Factor analysis is a 
statistical procedure that decomposes the shared variance among sets of observed measurement 
values into common and variable-specific portions, and distributes common variance across a 
smaller set of linear functions called factors (Harman, 1967).  The latent variables that are 
purportedly revealed by factor analysis cannot be observed directly, but must be inferred from 
values that are observable (i.e., knowable).  For factor models emerging from the lexical tradition, 
including the Five Factor Model, self- and other-rating/rankings with respect to natural language 
traits are generally used as measures of observable behavior.  The resulting linear models of 
aggregate variance are yet another referent of the term “trait,” though they do not correspond to 
any of the verbal definitions given for the term.  
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So far, four definitions of “trait” have been outlined: 1) patterns of observable behavior 
displayed by individuals, 2) internal structures believed to cause observable patterns of behavior 
in individuals, 3) natural language terms that are believed to encode whether and to what extent a 
person engages in a specific class of behaviors and 4) aggregate shared variance in observable 
behaviors, often operationalized in terms of the previous definition, modeled as a linear function.  
It is in the latter sense that traits are believed to be quantitative, although trait researchers are not 
clear as to whether factors are intended as models of hypothesized internal structures that cause 
variation in observed behaviors or a collective portion of the variance of a syndrome of observed 
behaviors that are caused by hypothesized internal structures (Boag, 2011). Regardless of which 
definition is adopted, factors represent relations among a set of items— not persons- with respect 
to the proportion of variance a sample of ratings made on each item contribute to a pool of shared 
variance.  As Lamiell (2003) has pointed out elsewhere, the personality trait-dimensions extracted 
using factor analysis do not refer to any attribute, quantitative or otherwise, possessed by 
individuals, and any conclusion to the contrary is based on a misunderstanding of the statistical 
procedure. 
Trait measures constructed in accordance with factor models generally consist of a 
number of dispositional or behavioral items that load highly onto a single factor along which 
people are asked to rate themselves using a graded scale (e.g., a Likert-type scale; i.e., the same 
type of procedure used to obtain the raw data used to create many factor-based scales).  The 
values assigned to the resulting responses may then be summed or averaged under the assumption 
that they are quantities—these summed or averaged responses may also be weighted by the 
proportion of variance the item contributes to the total variance of the factor--to produce a score 
that is then treated as an indicator of the magnitude with which the rated person possesses the 
target latent trait.  Individuals may then be assigned a percentile score relative to scores obtained 
from a demographic of interest (e.g., females, Americans, etc.)  These are considered to be valid 
quantitative measurements of traits because when the aggregate variance obtained from the 
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measures is modeled as a linear function, it closely reproduces traits qua linear factor models of 
aggregate variance. That is, the target relational system pertains to aggregate variance plus error, 
so the measures are considered to be valid because they are highly correlated with a target factor 
and not correlated or less correlated with non-target factors.  Regardless of the ontological status 
individual researchers ascribe to latent factors, we must acknowledge that a precondition of a 
meaningful factor model is that the values analyzed using factor analytic procedures are valid 
representations of empirical systems that are knowable and thus subject to empirical validation. 
The following self-rating item is taken from the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992), a 
personality measure that is used for a variety of purposes including personality research and 
employee selection.  The instructions and rating scale are typical of personality measures that 
have been shown to have good psychometric properties.   
Instructions:  Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement.  Rank yourself 
in relation to others who are similar to you in age and sex. 
 




Disagree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
When the target relational system is an aggregate level factor comprised of non-specific 
variance, the results of this measurement procedure may appear valid; however, when each item 
is considered as a measurement procedure that should produce values consistent with the axioms 
proper to the type of relational representation that is claimed, this common format is revealed as 
inordinately complex.  Among other shortcomings, the item reflects the inattention to the target 
system that is typical of measurement procedures that are validated by virtue of statistical 
convergence/divergence, and without which measurement validity and error lack meaning.  
Before we can treat ratings on this item as representations of quantity, we must first establish that 
a rating of “Agree” corresponds to four times the magnitude of the target attribute that 
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corresponds to a rating of “Strongly Agree,” however it is not clear how even a single response 
value on this scale should be interpreted as the target unit is not clearly defined.  Suppose Person 
A worries infrequently (i.e., not “a lot”), but is consumed by worry in those times (i.e., “a lot”), 
while Person B worries frequently (i.e., “a lot”), but is only mildly distressed by it (i.e., “not a 
lot”)?  Is “strongly agree” an equally appropriate description of both Person A and Person B?  
That is unclear.  Even considered apart from the complexity of the item as a whole, the middle 
option (i.e., Neither Agree nor Disagree) makes no readily apparent sense.  Is it intended to give 
the rater the opportunity to abstain from answering the question similar to a “?” option?  Is it 
intended as a neutral point?  That is also unclear.  It is scored as a “3,” so regardless of the 
meaning the test-makers intended or the rater’s interpretation, it is added towards a final sum 
score as three times more agreement than Strongly Disagree, and 1/3 less agreement than 
Strongly Agree.  Furthermore, treating these ratings as quantities implies that there are an infinite 
number of gradations of agreement/disagreement between each response value, but that the ratees 
exhibit only the magnitudes shown.  The inclusion of the instruction for raters to consider the 
statement regarding his/her behavior relative to a vaguely defined comparison group adds to the 
difficulty of discerning the intent of the item.  The belief that self-report measures provide 
meaningful relations among multiple persons relies on the implicit assumption that people are 
able to order themselves and other people in relation to one another.  When raters are instructed to 
consider themselves in relation to a specific context group, this implicit assumption is extended to 
include the belief that people are able to order themselves and other people who belong to the 
specific group in relation to one another.  Ideally, all raters are willing and able to do so, and as 
such raters who belong to the same specified demographic group will consider themselves in 
relation to one another, which could be interpreted as a basis for treating identical responses 
among raters as representing identical relations with respect to the attributes in question.  These 
assumptions are untested and many procedures would be required to support them.  The fact that 
this item was taken from what is considered to be an empirically validated personality measure 
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serves as clear evidence of the need to return to fundamental measurement issues in this area 
before we can claim to have measured traits, latent or otherwise, at the individual level. 
Measuring Neuroticism 
Trait Neuroticism is one of the most heavily researched personality constructs of the 20th 
century, but as is the case with other personality traits there is no consensus as to the referent of 
the term “Neuroticism” that can be identified as a unit applicable at the level of the individual.  It 
is associated with a variety of definitions, each so vague that it is difficult where not impossible to 
ascertain what a single researcher means by it in a single instance.  It has been identified, for 
example, as a “relatively enduring disposition to experience negative affect,” “a dimension of 
psychopathology,” and a “susceptibility to psychological distress.”  These definitions might serve 
to clarify the concept of Neuroticism provided that the contained terms were clarified in turn.  As 
it is, they make use of terms that are also highly ambiguous (e.g., what is the standard that gives 
meaning to the phrase “relatively enduring”? how do we distinguish “susceptibility” to 
psychological distress from actual psychological distress? what anchors and comprises a 
“dimension of psychopathology”?).  Depending upon how such terms are disambiguated, the 
construct evoked by the term “Neuroticism” may be highly consistent or highly inconsistent 
within and/or across researchers.   
A Neuroticism or Neuroticism-like factor dimension is reliably extracted from varied 
data sets and is recognizable in some form within almost all theoretically or empirically based 
models of general personality structure (e.g., Digman, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 2003).  The 
misinterpretation of factor analysis has resulted in the treatment of this fact as evidence that 
Neuroticism qua statistical factor is a truly general structure (i.e., present in all persons), as 
opposed to an aggregate structure.  In Digman’s (1990) enthusiastic review of the five-factor 
model of general personality structure, he refers to personality factors from various models 
representing the presence and effects of negative emotionality using the generic term “Dimension 
IV,” a dimension generally referred to as Neuroticism “to line up with the vast work of Eysenck 
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over the years” (p. 422).  Other theorists employ the terms “emotional stability,” which often 
appears as the opposite of neuroticism in some models-- or simply “stability” (Guilford, 1975; 
Goldberg, 1993), “emotionality” (Lee & Ashton, 2004), “negative emotionality/temperament” 
(Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson & Clark, 1994), and “harm avoidance” (Cloninger, 2000), but 
this practice is largely considered to reflect arbitrary preference rather than construct divergence 
as the scales themselves produce highly convergent scores.   
 It is clear that Neuroticism measures that are validated on the aggregate level do not 
target individual relations onto Neuroticism, but what would we need to do to construct a valid 
representation of individual Neuroticism?  Lamiell (2011) has suggested that researchers focus on 
individuals’ raw scores instead of normalized percentile scores (i.e., make minor adjustments in 
the way we use current scales).  It is quite harder than that because, even though the purported 
target system occurs at the level of individuals, our current scales are nonetheless created as 
measures of aggregate variance; that is, aggregate bias is built in to the scale.  We would have to 
pursue a definition of Neuroticism that is applicable to individuals, but what definition should we 
pursue?  In addition to the fact that broad definitions of Neuroticism, so or otherwise named, can 
be interpreted as referring to a number of types of relational systems (e.g., quantities or ratios of 
discrete behaviors/emotions, motivation to engage in behaviors or to experience emotions, 
duration of behaviors/emotions), various models and measures of Neuroticism are clearly 
disparate in regards to which behaviors and/or emotions are construct-relevant.  Table 1 lists the 
facet scales of the Neuroticism scale of the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO PI-R), an 
assessment of personality dimensions within the five-factor model (FFM), the Negative 
Emotionality scale of the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & 
Tellegen, 1988), the Negative Affectivity scale of the Multidimensional Personality 
Questionnaire (MPQ; Tellegen & Waller, 2008), the Negative Emotionality scale of the 
HEXACO Personality Inventory (HEXACO-PI; Lee & Ashton, 2004), the Harm Avoidance 
Scale of the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI; Cloninger, Przybeck, Svrakic, & 
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Wetzel, 1994), an expansion of the Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (TPQ; Cloninger, 
Przybeck, & Svrakic, 1991), and the neuroticism scale of the Eysenck Personality Profiler (EPP; 
Eysenck & Wilson, 1991).  There is a readily recognizable theme both within and across these 
scales, but the lack of overlap between the facets of scales is striking.   
Table 1. Facets of negative and/or unstable emotionality related subscales 
 
In short, provided that Neuroticism is an attribute, quantitative or otherwise, that is 
possessed by individuals and thus permits the representation of individuals relations with respect 
to it, existing procedures designed to measure it are inadequate to the task. The implication of the 
non-committal and inconsistent language associated with Neuroticism is that we cannot target a 
NEO PI-R PANAS MPQ HEXACO TCI EPP 
Angry hostility Hostility Aggression    
Anxiety   Anxiety Fear of 
uncertainty 
Anxiety 
Depression      





   
Impulsivity      
 Irritability/Anger     
 Fear  Fear   
 Scared     
 Nervous     
 Jittery     
 Guilty    Guilt 
 Ashamed     
 Upset/Distressed     
 Distressed    Unhappiness 
  Alienation    
   Sentimentality   
   Dependence  Dependency 
    Fatigability  
    Anticipatory 
worry 
 
    Shyness  
     Inferiority 
     Hypochondriacal 
     Obsessive 
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valid representation of empirical relations, quantitative or otherwise, of individuals with respect 
to Neuroticism that is consistent with a single definition associated with the existing measures.  
Given that the present state of scientific definitions and “measures” of Neuroticism provides little 
foundation on which to build a serious measurement inquiry, there are a number of empirical 
systems that might be considered equally valid measurement targets.  One approach would 
certainly be to disambiguate one of the many existing definitions of trait Neuroticism that appears 
in trait literature; it would be tedious, but possible, to create a precise, objective definition of 
Neuroticism that could then be imposed onto individuals as a measurement standard.  The most 
appropriate target of any measurement procedure is dictated by theory and need. The system that 
is of most theoretical interest to the present study is that of subjective relations of individuals with 
respect to traits qua dispositional terms/phrases that appear in natural language.  One justification 
for this is that this definition of a trait is the only one from trait literature that appears to be a 
viable target.  Neither traits qua “patterns of observable behavior” nor traits qua internal 
structures as causes of behavior are as yet well conceptualized, and traits qua statistical factors do 
not even occur at the level of the individual.  Another is that, stripping away all the confusing 
formatting, the trait measures that have been and continue to be used in research and industry 
come down to ratings with respect to traits qua dispositional attributes.  A third is that language is 
a natural starting point for modeling personality if it is the aim of personality researchers to 
develop a scientific model of personality that is consistent with the phenomenon of personality as 
how we “know” one another (McAdams, 1995).    
Present Study 
 A study was designed to address two measurement questions concerning Neuroticism-
domain ratings: 1) Do self- and other-ratings satisfy the transitivity, which is the first axiomatic 
condition of both ordinal and quantitative structure? 2) Do multiple broad definitions of 
Neuroticism as a general personality dimension used interchangeably in personality literature 
communicate the same construct to lay raters?   The traits selected for use in this study represent 
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the facets of the NEO model of Neuroticism that are assessed in the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 
1992; i.e., Angry Hostility, Anxiety, Depression, Self-Consciousness, Vulnerability to Stress, and 
Impulsivity.)  Three broad definition of Neuroticism were also taken from the NEO literature: 1) 
Emotionally unstable, 2) Sensitive, emotional and prone to experience feelings that are upsetting 
and 3) Prone to psychological distress.  Given the lack of consistency in the trait literature, it can 
be argued that any set of traits and definitions appearing in a single Neuroticism trait scale/model 
would have been equally appropriate for use in this study.  NEO Neuroticism-domain constructs 
were selected primarily on the basis of the model’s popularity. 
Question One: Transitivity 
Transitivity states that, for any three values X, Y and Z of Variable Q,  if X ≥ Y and Y ≥ 
Z, then X ≥ Z, and by implication, if X < Y and Y < Z, then X < Z.  In other words, provided that 
three entities X, Y and Z each possess some magnitude of Variable Q, if at a given point in time 
entity X possesses more Q than entity Y, and entity Y possesses more Q than entity Z, entity X 
must posses more Q than entity Z.  Provided that the magnitude of Variable Q possessed by the 
entities is stable over time, transitivity should be satisfied even if the measurements are taken at 
different times.  If the values produced by a procedure designed to measure the magnitudes of 
Variable Q violate transitivity for any three entities, it suggests that a) the measurement procedure 
is invalid (i.e., it fails to represent actual ordinal or quantitative relations onto Variable Q), b) 
Variable Q does not permit ordinal structure (e.g., it is not a unidimensional attribute) or c) if the 
measurements were not obtained simultaneously, the magnitude of Variable Q possessed by 
entities X, Y and Z is not stable over time.  In any of these events, the values produced by such a 
measurement procedure cannot be treated as quantities of a common Variable Q. 
 Consider for example, a case in which a ruler (i.e., a standard of length) is used to 
conduct pairwise ratings of the height of three persons, Tom, Dick and Harry.  When the ruler is 
used to compare Tom and Dick, the procedure indicates that Tom is taller than Dick; when the 
ruler is used to compare Dick and Harry, the procedure indicates that Dick is taller than Harry; 
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when the ruler is used to compare Tom and Harry, the procedure indicates that Tom is shorter 
than Harry, a value that violations the expectation of transitivity.  This suggests that a) the ruler 
has changed over time (i.e., the measurement standard is inconsistent across ratings), or b) the 
height of one or more of the three persons shifted from the first pairwise comparison to the 
second (i.e., height is not stable over time).  Whatever the reason, we cannot treat the values 
obtained using this procedure as quantities of height (i.e., length) without further qualification. 
 In the case of psychometric procedures in which people are asked to make self- and/or 
other-ratings on a scale with respect to psychological attributes, like personality “traits”, we are 
essentially handing them a ruler (i.e., the scale itself) and providing training as to how the ruler 
should be applied (i.e., the instructions).   If we are to treat these ratings as representations of 
quantitative relations with respect to the attribute in question, we must justify the following 
assumptions: 1) the attribute, as stated in the item, evokes a unidimensional attribute possessed by 
self and others and 2) that raters are able to rank themselves and others consistently with respect 
to said attribute.  We can demonstrate grounds for these assumptions at the level of the individual 
by showing that individual raters can make transitive ordinal judgments (i.e., “more,” “less,” or 
“equal”) of the self and others with respect to psychological attributes.   Examining the 
transitivity of trait-ratings strips away the unnecessary and premature complexity of existing trait 
measurement procedures that were never designed to represent individual trait relations in the 
first place to expose the answer to the very basic question of whether people are able to produce 
trait rankings that are logically consistent with the assumptions of quantitative measurement.   
If, as trait theorists believe, a person is called “impulsive” because he or she is 
objectively impulsive (e.g., he/she performs many impulsive acts and/or few acts that are not 
impulsive), and one person is called “more impulsive” than another because the former actually 
performs more impulsive acts and fewer non-impulsive acts than the latter, then subjective 
judgments of the relative “impulsivity” of the self and known others conducted in a single sitting 
should satisfy the assumption of transitivity provided that the rater does not observe the ratees 
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engaging in any “impulsive” or notably “non-impulsive” behavior during the actual rating task 
(i.e., objective “impulsivity” does not change.)  If, however, subjective judgments of relative 
impulsivity violate the assumption of transitivity, it suggests that the rater’s standard of 
“impulsivity” changes during the sitting; in either case, subjective ratings of “impulsivity” given 
by the rater cannot be treated as ordinal relations with respect to impulsivity and they certainly 
cannot be treated as quantitative relations with respect to impulsivity.  Transitive trait ratings are 
equally anticipated by the slightly different assumption that people can order self and others with 
respect to traits qua dispositions to engage in certain behaviors rather than actual engagement in 
certain behaviors.   
In order to test the implicit assumption of transitivity behind the treatment of NEO 
Neuroticism-domain ratings as quantitative relations, participants were asked to make a series of 
pair-wise rankings of themselves and known others with respect to both representative items from 
each NEO Neuroticism sub-domain and each of three broad definitions of Neuroticism as a 
general personality dimension.  The transitive consistency of their pairwise rankings was then 
examined in the context of triplet relationships.  A conditional hypothesis was associated with 
this task:  If trait ratings are a valid representation of ordinal relations, then pairwise comparisons 
would satisfy the assumption of transitivity.   
Question Two: Inter-definition Rank Consistency 
 Several definitions of Neuroticism as a general personality dimension appear in trait 
literature.  At face value, these definitions are ambiguous.  Not only does this make it difficult to 
ascertain the intended referent of a single definition, it makes the practice of using multiple 
definitions interchangeably highly questionable.  It may be the case that these seemingly 
ambiguous definitions are practically synonymous, but this is a question that can and must be 
addressed empirically.  If multiple definitions communicate the same referent, a person who is 
asked to rank or rate people with respect to each definition should produce identical relations 
along each definition.  If a single rater ranks or rates people differently with respect to multiple 
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descriptions of what is purportedly a single construct, it suggests that the descriptions do not have 
identical meaning for that rater.  This simple, straightforward test of inter-item consistency 
exposes entity-level relations that are obscured by measures of statistical convergence.    
Participants in this study ranked all known others along with themselves on each of the 
three broad Neuroticism definitions simultaneously (i.e., all persons at the same time with respect 
to three different constructs in turn).  Individual proportions of rank matches across all possible 
pairings and across all definitions were calculated.  The conditional hypothesis associated with 
this task was as follows:  If the broad Neuroticism definitions evoke the same construct in 
participants regardless of their apparent ambiguity, the rank positions of persons should be 
consistent across all of them.   
Summary 
 The procedures used in the present study were design a) to test explicit and implicit 
measurement claims that have been made regarding self- and other-report ratings with respect to 
NEO Neuroticism-domain attributes and b) to test whether multiple broad-level definitions of 
Neuroticism taken from the NEO literature can be used interchangeably on the basic of the as-yet 
untested assumption that they are practically synonymous.  In addition to addressing these 
specific questions, these procedures used here are offered as methods that may be valuable as 











 A total of 147 participated in this study.  All were undergraduate students at Oklahoma 
State University and received course credit in exchange for their participation.  One-hundred and 
sixteen participants were female, and the remaining 31 participants were male.  The majority of 
participants (67.3%) reported their ethnicity as Caucasian, 15.6% as African American, 2.7% as 
Asian, 4.15% as Hispanic, 6.8% as Native American, and 3.4% as Other.  Age ranged from 18 to 
50, with the majority of participants between 18 and 21 (M = 18.27, SD = 3.28).  
Instruments and Methods 
Name Elicitation Procedure 
 A Name Elicitation Procedure was used to generate a list of names to be used in the 
pairwise and complex ranking procedures (Appendix A).  Participants were asked to provide the 
first names or nicknames of 7 people known personally to him/her.  Participants were also asked 
to indicate a) the sex and age of each person and b) how well he/she knows the person using the 
following categories: 1) “I know this person extremely well,” 2) “I do not know this person 
extremely well, but he/she is more than an acquaintance,” and 3) “This person is an 
acquaintance.”  Participants were instructed to indicate each person’s exact age when it was 
known and to estimate his/her age as closely as possible when the exact age was unknown.  
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Pairwise Ranking Task 
 Pairwise rankings were generated using a 364-item ranking task in which every pairwise 
combination of the 7 people listed on the Naming Elicitation Procedure along with “Myself” were 
compared with respect to 10 Neuroticism-domain Attributes including 5 positive markers (e.g., 
panics easily) and 5 negative markers (e.g., rarely feels irritated) taken from the International 
Personality Items Pool (IPIP) 20-item NEO Neuroticism-domain scale, and 3 general descriptions 
of Neuroticism (e.g., prone to psychological distress) for a total of 13 NEO Neuroticism-domain 
attributes (Appendix B).   
 Each item consisted of the presentation of two names drawn randomly from a pool of 
names along with one of the 13 Neuroticism-domain attributes.  The ranking task was 
computerized, and the items appeared one at a time on a monitor in the following format: 
 Consider the attribute: Prone to psychological distress 
 Who possesses MORE of this attribute, Person 1 or Person 2 (If they exhibit the attribute 
equally, select Equal.) 
   
           Prone to psychological distress 
 
□ Person 1  □ Person 2  □ Equal 
  
Use “A,” “S,” “D” and Enter keys to make ratings faster. 
Participants were always asked to indicate which of the persons shown possessed/exhibited more 
of the attribute; that is, they were never asked to indicate which of the person possessed/exhibited 
less of the attribute.    This was done to minimize judgment errors that might occur as the result of 
misreading the item.  A progress bar also appeared at the bottom of the screen to allow 
participants to track their progress on the task.  Participants were instructed that they could use 
the computer mouse or the keyboard to make ratings.  Participants were also informed they could 
change their response as many times as they wanted before proceeding to the next item, but that 




Dynamic Analog Scale (DAS):  Complex Ranking Procedure 
 The DAS is a technique developed by Grice, Jackson and Badzinski (2011) for 
generating single-item measures for various personality traits.  A single DAS scale is comprised 
of an analog-type scale anchored by trait definitions onto which participants use a computer 
mouse to “drag and drop” names, creating simultaneously ratings of all rated persons.  Three 
DAS scales were devised for the purpose of this study each anchored by the three broad 
Neuroticism Definitions that appeared in the pairwise ranking procedure.  Each vertical scale was 
anchored at the top by the phrase “The MOST ‘Neuroticism Definition’ person imaginable” and 
at the bottom by the phrase “The LEAST ‘Neuroticism Definition’ person imaginable.”  This 
phrasing was selected to avoid altering in the meaning of the phrases.  For example, it is unclear 
whether the phrase “the least emotionally unstable person imaginable” is semantically equivalent 
to the phrase “the most emotionally stable person imaginable.”  The scale midpoint was also 
indicated.  Participants were instructed to “drag and drop” each name onto the point on the scale 
that he/she believed best represented the extent to which each person exhibited the relevant 
attribute.  For the purposes of this study, scale positions were converted into ranks.   
Procedure 
After providing informed consent, each participant completed a brief demographic 
questionnaire followed by the Name Elicitation Procedure.  When participants completed the 
Name Elicitation Procedure, a researcher entered the seven elicited names along with “Myself” 
into the pairwise ranking program and the DAS complex rating program.  Participants then 
completed the Pairwise Ranking Procedure, followed by the DAS Complex Ranking Procedure in 
private workspaces separated by dividers.  Up to 4 participants completed the study at any given 
time during data collection.  Following completion of all tasks, each participant was given a 






Identifying Transitivity Violations 
The pairs associated with each NEO Neuroticism-domain attribute were organized into 
all possible triplets (total 56) and examined for transitivity violations, or relationships that are 
inconsistent with the assumption that pairwise rankings are valid representations of real 
relationships with respect to a single, stable attribute permitting at least ordinal relations.  The 
process of coding and classifying triplet patterns as transitive or intransitive was programmed into 
the Pairwise Ranking Procedure.   
Transitivity Violation Indices 
A transitivity violation index (i.e., TVI = # Intransitive Triplets/ (# Transitive Triplets + # 
Intransitive Triplets) was computed for 1) each Neuroticism-domain Attribute and broad 
Neuroticism Definition for all participants and 2) all Neuroticism-domain Attributes and broad 
Neuroticism Definitions for all participants.  Participant by Attribute and Definition Transitivity 
Indices were also computed and summarized.  While a valid ranking procedure on a supposedly 
ordinal/quantitative measurement procedure should produce values that satisfy transitivity across 
all rated entities, calculating the TVIs of various subgroups allows us to explore whether 
characteristics of triplets and/or constructs might facilitate ordinal consistency.  
DAS Complex Ranking Procedure 
The consistency of rankings across the three broad-level Neuroticism definitions were 
summarized in terms of 1) the proportion of names, including “Myself,” that appear in the same 
rank position on all possible pairs of complex ranking tasks and 2) the proportion of names, 
including “Myself,” that appear in the same rank position on all three complex ranking tasks.  
Only identical ranks across scales (i.e., zero difference) were considered as “matches.” 
Post hoc Analyses 
 A number of post hoc analyses were conducted to address three questions: 
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1) Are Neuroticism ratings any more or less consistent when triplets contain “Myself” than 
when triplets do not contain “Myself”?   
The belief that self-report measures provide meaningful relations among multiple persons relies 
implicitly on the assumption that people are able to consider themselves in relation to others.  It 
may be, however, that people take different information into account when comparing themselves 
with another person as opposed to comparing two other people.  By definition, each triplet 
ranking pattern will include at least one pairwise judgment between two non-self persons.  For 
this reason, it is unclear if we should anticipate greater or fewer transitivity violations associated 
with self-included triplets than with triplets that do not include the self.  Nonetheless, separate 
TVIs were calculated for both of these groups as the results may be of interest. 
2) Do triplets in which all ratees are matched with respect to sex and age yield lower rates of 
intransitivity than triplets in which ratees are unmatched with respect to sex and/or age? 
It may be the case that certain attribute phrases evoke a different standard in the context 
of pairs that are similar with respect to sex and age than in the context of pairs that are dissimilar 
with respect to sex and/or age.  For example, gender and/or age-related expectations may prompt 
a person to employ a different standard of “Not easily frustrated” when comparing a sex-
congruent pair than comparing a sex-incongruent pair, or draw on different behavioral 
information in determining whether two adults are equally described by “remains calm under 
pressure” than in determining whether an adult and a child are equally described by the same 
phrase.  If this is the case, shifting standards may contribute to higher levels of inconsistency 
among triplets that are unmatched with respect to sex and/or age.    
3) Are transitivity violations rarer among triplets representing the most ideal rating 
scenarios appearing in this study? 
Personality scales sometimes instruct raters to consider themselves in relations to others 
who are similar to them in sex and age.  Inasmuch as this is intended to increase the validity and 
inter-person comparability of self-ratings, sets of pairwise ratings between “Myself” and similar 
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others may be expected to facilitate transitive consistency.  For this reason, triplets with these 
characteristics were considered as possible “best case” ratings scenarios (i.e., “Best Case Scenario 
I” triplets).   The context group intended by these instructions is somewhat vague; there may, for 
example, be observable differences between self-ratings made in the context of similar others 
who are well-known to the rater as opposed to similar others who are not well-known to the rater.  
In anticipation of potentially observable differences between these groups, self-included triplets 
in which the two non-self ratees were both similar to the rater with respect to sex and age and 
“extremely well known” to the rater were also considered as a potential “best case” ratings 
scenario (i.e., “Best Case Scenario II” triplets).  Separate TVI’s were calculated for “Best Case 
Scenario I” triplets and all other triplets as well as “Best Case Scenario II” triplets and all other 
triplets. 
All post hoc analyses were conducted using the Proportional Analysis feature of 
Observation Orienting Modeling (OOM) software, a system developed by Grice (2010), to assess 
the degree of conformity between the deep structure matrices of observations on multiple 
orderings.  Proportional Analysis is a feature of Observation Oriented Modeling (OOM) software 
(Grice, 2011) that compares a predicted pattern of proportions to an observed pattern of 
proportions.   Proportional analysis is similar to a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test in that it 
calculates the difference between the expected and predicted proportions of each variable level  
OOM also calculates the probability that the proportion of correctly classified observations (PCC) 
is due to chance by comparing it to the proportions of correctly classified observations in 
randomized versions of the data.  Through a repeated (e.g., 500 to 1000 times) two-step process 
of 1) generating randomized data and 2) calculating the PCC between the predicted pattern and 
the randomized data, OOM produces a chance value, or c-value, which is the proportion of times 










Pairwise Ranking Procedure 
The Transitivity Violation Index for all triplets for all participants on all Neuroticism 
constructs (i.e., both the 10 Neuroticism-domain Attributes and the 3 broad Neuroticism 
definitions) was .22.  The TVIs for all triplets for all participants on each Neuroticism-domain 
Attributes ranged from .20 to .24, and the TVIs for all participants on each of the broad 
Neuroticism definitions ranged from .21 to .23 (Table 2). 
The mean Individual TVIs (i.e., participant x construct) on each of the Neuroticism-
domain Attributes ranged from .21 (Attributes 5 and 7; SDs = .14 and .15, respectively) to .25 
(Attribute 10; SD = .16); and the Individual TVIs on each of the broad Neuroticism definitions 
ranged from .21 (Definition 3; SD = .16) to .24 (Definition 1; SD = .15).  On all Neuroticism 
constructs, the minimum TVI was .00, while the maximum TI was .66.  The mean of the overall 
Individual TVIs (i.e., each person on all Neuroticism constructs) was .23 (SD = .11, Range = .05 
to .55; Table 3). 
(Attribute 10; SD = .16); and the Individual TVIs on each of the broad Neuroticism 
definitions ranged from .21 (Definition 3; SD = .16) to .24 (Definition 1; SD = .15).  On all 
Neuroticism constructs, the minimum TVI was .00, while the maximum TI was .66.  The mean of 
the overall Individual TVIs (i.e., each person on all Neuroticism constructs) was .23 (SD = .11, 
Range = .05 to .55; Table 3).   
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A summary of Individual TVIs was also prepared separately for Males (N = 26) and 
Females (N = 108).  The mean TVIs for Females were comparable to the means for all subjects 
ranging from .20 (Attribute 5; SD = .14) to .24 (Attribute 6; SD = .14; see Table 4).  The mean 
TVIs for Males ranged from .18 (Attribute 7; SD = .15) to .29 (Attribute 2; SD = .18), and the 
highest minimum TVIs for males were .36, on Attributes 4 and 5 and Definition 1 (see Table 5).   
Post Hoc Analyses of Transitivity Violation Indices 
Proportional analyses were conducted to ascertain the extent to which the TVIs 
associated with triplets including “Myself” could be predicted using the TVIs of the remaining 
triplets (e.g., all triplets not including “Myself”).  The proportional analyses for transitivity 
violations on each of the 10 NEO Neuroticism Domain Attributes and each of the 3 Broad 
Neuroticism Definitions yielded a high match rate and low chance value (all PCCs ≥ .97and all c-
values = .00 based on 500 randomizations of the Myself-included dataset) revealing that triplet 
patterns were equally inconsistent in triplets that included “Myself” and that that did not include 
“Myself” (see Table 6). 
Proportional analyses were conducted to ascertain the extent to which the TVIs 
associated with triplets that were matched on both sex and age (i.e., Sex and Age Congruent 
Triplets) could be predicted using the TVIs of all triplets that were incongruent with respect to 
either sex or age.  Pairs were said to be matched with respect to age if the age differences was 
equal to or less than 5 years; triplets were said to be matched with respect to age if all involved 
pairs were matched in age.  The proportional analyses for transitivity violations on each of the 10 
NEO Neuroticism Domain Attributes and each of the 3 Broad Neuroticism Definitions yielded a 
high match rate and low chance value (all PCCs ≥ .95 and all c-values = .00 based on 500 
randomizations of the Sex and Age Congruent dataset) revealing that triplet patterns were equally 




Proportional analyses were conducted to ascertain to extent to which the TVI’s associated 
with “Best Case Scenario I” triplets (i.e., self-included, matched with respect to sex and age) 
could be predicted using the TVIs of all triplets not meeting these criteria.  The proportional 
analyses for transitivity violations on each of the 10 NEO Neuroticism Domain Attributes and 
each of the 3 Broad Neuroticism Definitions yielded a high match rate and low chance value (all 
PCCs ≥ .91 and all c-values = .00 based on 500 randomizations of the “Best Case Scenario I” 
dataset; Table 8) indicated that triplets satisfying these criteria were no more consistent than 
others. 
Finally, a series of proportional analyses were conducted to ascertain the extent to which 
the TVIs associated with “Best Case Scenario II” triplets (i.e., self-included triplets, all persons 
matched with respect to sex and age, both non-self ratees are “extremely well known” by the 
rater) could be predicted using the TVIs of all triplets not meeting these criteria.  The proportional 
analyses for transitivity violations on each of the 10 NEO Neuroticism Domain Attributes and 
each of the 3 Broad Neuroticism Definitions yielded a high match rate and low chance value (all 
PCCs ≥ .91 and all c-values = .00 based on 500 randomizations of the Best Case Scenario dataset) 
revealing that triplet patterns were equally inconsistent in these triplets as in the remaining triplets 
(see Table 9).  The 91% PCC-values, the lowest frequency match rates found in all of the 
proportional analyses, reflect a slightly greater incidence of intransitivity among the “Best Case 
Scenario I and II” triplets than among the remaining triplets; while a small effect, the direction of 
this difference is contrary to what we might expect if these were, in fact, representative of ideal 
ratings scenarios.  
Inter-definition Rank Consistency 
The overall match rate for ranks on the broad Neuroticism Definitions 1 and 2 (i.e., 
“Emotionally unstable” and “Sensitive, emotional and prone to feelings that are upsetting, 
respectively) ranged from .00 to .75 (i.e., zero matches to six out of eight matches; M = .29, SD = 
.17).  The overall rank match rate on broad Neuroticism Definitions 1 and 3 (i.e., “Emotionally 
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unstable” and “Prone to psychological distress,” respectively) ranged from .00 to 1.00 (i.e., zero 
to eight out of eight matches; M = .32, SD = .20).  The overall rank match rate on Definitions 2 
and 3 ranged from .00 to .875 (i.e., zero matches to seven out of eight matches; M = .29, SD = 
.19).  Finally, the overall rank match rate on all three broad Neuroticism definitions ranged from 
.00 to .50 (M = .15, SD = .14; Table 10).  An examination of rank matches by sex revealed 
similar patterns across Males and Females (Table  11), and a post hoc proportional analysis 










It has been argued that psychometrics qualifies as a pathological science on the basis that 
the prevailing psychometric paradigm prevents the attainment of its stated goals and conflicting 
interests prevent its constituents from recognizing that this is the case.  Michell (1997) has made 
this argument from the perspective that the goal of psychometrics is the measurement of 
psychological attributes, where measurement is properly defined as the “the estimation or 
discovery of the ratio of some magnitude of a quantitative attribute to a unit of the same 
attribute,” p. 358, and where a quantitative attribute is a range of properties or relations that 
admits infinite variation in degrees of magnitude (Ellis, 1996; Michell, 1990; Trendler, 2009).  
Having proposed that measurement is the representation of an empirical system,  I concur with 
Michell that psychometrics is pathological, but do so on the grounds that psychometricians and 
people who employ psychometric procedures have failed to demonstrate that psychological 
measures produces valid representations of any empirical system, quantitative or otherwise.   
There are several ways in which the prevailing psychometric paradigm keeps us in the dark with 
respect to what the values produces by psychometric procedures represent.  Among them is the 
tendency to use ambiguous language (e.g., does a person who worries frequently, but functions 
well “worry a lot” in the same way as a person who worries infrequently but is, at those times, 
consumed with worry?) and the tendency to overlook or disregard the implications of scale labels 
(e.g., if a person “agrees somewhat” with a statement does that person also “disagree somewhat” 
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” with that statement?  If so, how do we justify assigning different values to these responses?)  
This inattention to item/scale construction makes it difficult to determine what if any relational 
system is targeted by a measurement procedure.  Additionally, psychometric  procedures in which 
a single person rates multiple ratees is either done using multiple items (i.e., separate ratings for 
each person) or on a single item that may obscure inconsistencies in judgment (i.e., a forced 
ranking item).  This prevents us from obtaining values that we might test against the appropriate 
axioms of measurement.  The obfuscation does not stop with these.  Proponents of the use of item 
response theory in the construction of personality scales present a baffling argument that peoples’ 
ability to use a pencil to circle a response on a questionnaire are limited to some extent with 
respect to which responses they are able to circle by some internal quantitative property (e.g., 
Neuroticism).  Perhaps the most self-defeating psychometric practice is that of “establishing 
psychometric validity” through the demonstration of statistical convergence and divergence of the 
values produced by measurement procedures.  This might be adequate if the goal of measurement 
is to represent generic aggregate variance onto generic statistical functions, but if the goal of 
measurement is the representation of the relations of real entities with respect to real qualities this 
paradigm is inadequate as real qualities are defined by their essential characteristics.   
Personality is one among many areas in which researchers claim to measure 
psychological attributes at the level of the individual, but have not addressed basic measurement 
concerns.  This study was designed to test two necessary but insufficient conditions that must be 
met before self- and/or other-report ratings with respect to NEO Neuroticism-domain attributes 
can be treated as quantities.  Specifically, it tested the assumption that people are willing and able 
to make pairwise ordinal comparisons that are consistent with the assumption of transitivity at the 
triplet level.  It also tested the assumption that apparently ambiguous definitions of Neuroticism 
that are used interchangeably in the NEO literature are practically synonymous among raters (i.e., 
lay raters).  In addition to addressing these specific questions, these procedures are offered as 
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methods that may be valuable as components of a systematic effort towards rehabilitating the 
pathological science of psychometrics. 
Triplet Transitivity 
Transitivity is a basic assumption of quantitative measurement.  That is, if a measurement 
procedure is successful in its aim to represent ordinal or quantitative relations, comparative 
judgments of pairs with respect to the target variable will be consistent when considered at the 
triplet level.  In the current study, participants were asked to conduct head-to-head comparisons 
(e.g., greater than, less than) of all possible pairwise combinations of people they know 
personally plus “Myself” with respect to 10 NEO Neuroticism-domain Attributes and 3 broad 
Neuroticism definitions found in the NEO literature.  These pairwise judgments were considered 
in the context of all possible triplet combinations and examined for transitivity.  Roughly 20% to 
25% of the triplets across all subjects were found to be intransitive.  The data were divided into 
several subgroups in turn based upon characteristics of the triplets that we believed might make 
consistency more/less likely.  Triplets including “Myself” were intransitive almost exactly as 
often as triplets not including “Myself,” sex and age congruent triplets were intransitive almost 
exactly as often as sex and/or age incongruent triplets.  Finally, triplets a) involving “Myself” and 
two other people of the same sex and similar in age and b) involving “Myself” and two other 
people of the same sex and similar age whom the rater indicated were “extremely well known” to 
him/her--we believed these rating scenario were most likely to facilitate consistency--were 
intransitive almost exactly as often as all other triplets.   
 These results indicate that individuals are often inconsistent when making pairwise 
comparisons of people they know personally with respect to Neuroticism-domain constructs.  
Some participants were consistent on some of the triads with respect to some of the Neuroticism 
attributes, but no participant made a completely consistent set of ratings.  This suggests that 1) the 
meaning of the attributes sometimes or always changed from one pairwise comparison to another 
or 2) the extent to which the known persons possessed or exhibited the attributes sometimes or 
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always changed from one pairwise comparison to another or that a combination of these two 
events occurred either simultaneously or in turn.  The objective body of behaviors produced by 
the rated people did not change as the participants did not observe them engaging in any new 
behaviors during the course of the study, the exception being that the participants could monitor 
their own feelings and behaviors as they completed the procedures.   
Implications 
What is the significance of these findings for personality research that relies on 
Neuroticism scores taken from self-report procedures?  At least one implication of intransitivity 
seems clear:  if people cannot make consistent judgments on a simplified task like this, we would 
be hard pressed to produce justification for treating values produced by any procedure that 
assumes people are both able and motivated to do so as representations of quantitative relations.  
In this study, 22% of pairwise ratings made by participants were inconsistent at the triplet level, 
meaning that 78% did satisfy transitivity.  Some might argue that this is an acceptable error rate, 
thus, good news for studies that treat trait measures as quantities, but this argument does not hold 
up.  First, if a single pairwise relationship is altered in an inconsistent triplet, it could potentially 
alter the relationships in many other triplets some of which were previously consistent.  Second, 
transitivity is a necessary but insufficient condition of quantitative structure.  By definition, 
attributes that satisfy the conditions of quantitative structure also satisfy the conditions of ordinal 
structure, but we cannot conclude that a measurement procedure produces quantitative values 
simply because it produces values that satisfy the condition of transitivity. 
Limitations 
 It is possible that the inconsistencies found in this study are attributable, at least in part, to 
particularities of the procedures rather than the inability of the participants to produce consistent 
ordinal relations with respect to the relevant constructs.  The order of the items on the pairwise 
rating task was randomized in order to minimize the participants’ ability to make consistent 
judgments by “keeping track” of their rating patterns instead of evaluating each pair with respect 
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to the attributes.  If participants had been asked to make all possible pairwise ratings with respect 
to a single attribute before moving onto the next attribute, they may have been less likely to 
switch constructs from comparison to comparison.  Participants were able to change their answers 
on each pairwise judgment an unlimited number of times, but were unable to return to a previous 
item once they selected “Enter.”  Again, this was done to minimize the participants’ ability to 
produce artificially consistent judgments, but if participants pressed “Enter” too quickly and were 
unable to correct the mistake, it may have resulted in inconsistent triplet patterns even when 
participants were able to make consistent judgments.  In the future, it may be advisable to have 
participants confirm their response to an item one additional time before moving to the next 
judgment.   The language used in the task may also have affected the results.  Trait phrases like 
“easily frustrated” read smoothly in the context of a Likert-type scale, but can be awkward in a 
pairwise ranking procedure.  From a trait-theory perspective, it is appropriate to talk about people 
exhibiting or possessing trait-related behaviors and/or dispositions, but that is not necessarily how 
people think about trait phrases as they appear in natural language.  For the purposes of this 
study, the trait phrases were taken from an existing measure and intentionally left unaltered in 
order to avoid disambiguating the language, but researchers using this method in the future may 
choose to change the language.  For example, if the intent is to evaluate the transitivity of the 
relative ratings of belief or agreement that an attribute phrase describes ratees, the items may be 
adapted to reflect this intent (e.g., “Which of these people do you think is best described by the 
phrase:  ‘easily frustrated’?”).  This format does not require researchers to alter the trait phrases 
that are currently used in Likert-type trait scales, but the responses are not readily interpretable as 
relations of rated persons or entities with respect to properties possessed or exhibited by them.  If 
the target empirical system is the actual degree to which ratees exhibit a trait-related behavior, it 
might be more appropriate to adapt phrases as follows:  “Who is more easily frustrated?” or 
“Who is more likely to remain calm under pressure?”  If the target empirical system is the degree 
to which ratees possess the disposition to engage in a certain behavior, it might be more 
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appropriate to adapt the phrases in a manner similar to this:  “Which of the following people is 
most likely to become frustrated” or “Which of the following people is most likely to remain 
calm under pressure?”  In any event, phrasing adaptations should be carefully chosen to reflect 
the target system.  One benefit of needing to attend carefully to item phrasing is that it requires 
researchers to clarify the constructs they wish to measure.     
Inter-definition Rank Consistency 
In addition to the pairwise rating procedure, participants were asked to rank themselves 
and seven known others with respect to three broad definitions of Neuroticism that appear in the 
NEO literature: 1) emotional instability, 2) sensitivity, emotionality and proneness to experience 
feeling that are upsetting, and 3) proneness to psychological distress.  Rank matches were 
calculated for each pair of descriptions and for all three descriptions.  The mean rank match rate 
for all pairs ranged from 29% to 32%, and the overall mean rank match rate was 15%, suggesting 
that, for the majority of participants, these definitions do not evoke the same construct.   
Implications  
These results suggests that the language used by Neuroticism researchers are not 
practically synonymous among lay people (i.e., people who are not familiar with trait jargon), 
which in turn suggests that trait Neuroticism researchers have not been successful in capturing 
important differences in the language that people use to describe the personalities of themselves 
and others along this “general dimension.” 
Limitations 
 The DAS procedure that was used to obtain the ranks was not a forced rank procedure.  
Participants “dragged and dropped” names onto an analog-type scale, and the scale positions were 
then converted into ranks.  While it is highly unlikely that participants intended to place 
participants at different scale points but placed them close enough together on the scale that they 
were assigned the same rank, it is possible that participants intended to place one or more names 
at the same scale point, but placed them far enough apart that they were assigned different ranks.  
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Researchers using this general method (i.e., inter-definition rank consistency) in the future may 
choose to alter the scale precision or to use another method to obtain rank-values.     
Conclusion 
When we ask participants to make self-ratings on a scale with respect to a psychological 
attribute, we attempt to communicate a standard (i.e. the scale and attribute in combination) and 
we assume that their answers are meaningful.  We do not have full faith in the judgment of 
participants, as we assume that all measurement procedures are subject to error, but we believe 
that statistical procedures allows us to separate the wheat from the chaff (i.e., variance 
attributable to true departures from the mean from variance attributable to error).  Unfortunately, 
all statistical analyses presume that the numbers we feed into them represent certain relations and 
it is our knowledge of the kinds of relations they represent that guides our selection of statistical 
procedures.  A chi-squared test, for example, presumes that all people who indicate that they are 
“depressed” share an understanding with one another and with the researchers of what it means to 
be “depressed.”  Various ordinal procedures assume that people who indicate they “Strongly 
Agree” with this or that statement a) share a common standard of what it means to strongly agree, 
b) share a common understanding of what it is with which they strongly agree, and c) agree more 
strongly with the statement than people who merely “Agree” with it.  That is, in order to distill 
measurement error from the values produced by psychometric procedures, we have to begin with 
valid measurements.  Quantitative procedures presume even more knowledge on the part of 
researchers than many ordinal procedures as they are meaningful only when applied to values 
representing quantities.   Procedures that treat ratings as ordinal relations comparable across raters 
(e.g., all people who are assigned a rank of “4” are equal with respect to the target) require 
additions assumptions beyond those that assume only intra-rater ordinality.  
The current study addressed some basic concerns regarding the measurement of 
Neuroticism that cannot be addressed using the prevailing psychometric vetting procedures.  
When asked to make pairwise comparisons of themselves and others with respect to Neuroticism-
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domain attributes, participants often made intransitive judgments.  These results may be 
attributable to some degree to particularities of the format of the pairwise ranking procedure; 
nonetheless, this is the kind of task that is required to justify the assumption that self- and/or 
other-ratings may be treated as representations of ordinal values.  We are, therefore, unjustified in 
continuing to treat self- and/or other-ratings with respect to these or any attributes as ordinal or 
quantitative relations based on any real or perceived limitations of this study.  Self- and other-
rankings with respect to three broad-level definitions of Neuroticism were also found to be highly 
inconsistent across definitions suggesting that these definitions are not practically synonymous—
at least among lay populations, and should not be treated as such.  Again, these results may be 
attributable, in whole or in part, to particularities of the ranking tasks that were used or to 
particularities of the sample; however, this is the kind of task that is required to justify using 
multiple terms interchangeably.  If it is only one’s intent to use terms interchangeably when 
communicating with a specific audience, then the practical equivalence of the terms need only be 
demonstrated with that audience, but it should be demonstrated.   
 The methods used in this study are not just useful for providing evidence for or against 
assumptions about existing measures.  They may also be used to help build valid measures and 
increase the conceptual clarity of any number of states or attributes.  If we want to count things, 
we need to begin with some idea of what constitutes a “thing.” If a person is asked to compare the 
number of “things” in a set of baskets and we find that the task produces values that are 
intransitive, we are presented with an opportunity to explore that persons’ understand of a 
“thing.”  We can then begin to adapt our understanding of thing-ness to conform to their 
understanding and/or adapt their understanding to conform to ours until the procedure does 
produce consistent responses.  That is, by using tasks like these in conjunction with conversation 
with raters, we stand to improve the precision of our measures by increasing our conceptual 
precision (i.e., our understanding of target systems).  By shifting the focus of measurement efforts 
away from the reduction of non-specific aggregate error and onto the reduction of conceptual 
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ambiguity, we may acknowledge the intimate relationship between quality and quantity to our 
great benefit.  One potential outcome of this paradigm shift is that researchers may begin to take 
more ownership of the measures they use; that is, they may be encouraged to develop measures 
and procedures that answer the questions they want to ask rather than relying on psychometric 
formats and procedures that work against them.  Statistical procedures provide probabilistic 
answers; a premature reliance on statistics may have led psychologists into a trap of believing that 
the answers to all of their questions are ultimately unknowable.  If psychological scientists adopt 
this attitude, the science of psychology is defeated before it begins.  We may not be able to say 
with certainty whether a person will or will not be in a specific state at a specific time, but it is 
certainly within our reach to define and recognize the states that concern us and this is ultimately 
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Instructions: In the spaces below, please provide the first name, nickname, or initials of 7 people 
you know personally.  For confidentiality purposes, please, do not include both first and last 
names.  Beside each name, please indicate each person’s sex (e.g., M = Male and F = Female) 
and approximate age.  Below each name, please place a check next to the option that best 
describes how well you know the person. 
 
              Name/Nickname                                      Sex             Age 
1. ___________________________                   ________    _________ 
 
___ I know this person extremely well.   
___ I do not know this person extremely well, but he/she is more than an “acquaintance.” 
___ This person is an acquaintance.   
   
   Name/Nickname                                      Sex             Age 
2. ___________________________                   ________    _________ 
___ I know this person extremely well.   
___ I do not know this person extremely well, but he/she is more than an “acquaintance.” 
___ This person is an acquaintance.     
 
  Name/Nickname                                      Sex             Age 
3. ___________________________                   ________    _________ 
___ I know this person extremely well.   
___ I do not know this person extremely well, but he/she is more than an “acquaintance.” 
___ This person is an acquaintance.  
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Name/Nickname                                      Sex             Age 
4. ___________________________                   ________    _________ 
 
___ I know this person extremely well.   
___ I do not know this person extremely well, but he/she is more than an “acquaintance.” 
___ This person is an acquaintance.   
                                                     
  Name/Nickname                                      Sex             Age 
5. ___________________________                   ________    _________ 
 
___ I know this person extremely well.   
___ I do not know this person extremely well, but he/she is more than an “acquaintance.” 
___ This person is an acquaintance.     
 
  Name/Nickname                                      Sex             Age 
 
6. ___________________________                   ________    _________ 
 
___ I know this person extremely well.   
___ I do not know this person extremely well, but he/she is more than an “acquaintance.” 
___ This person is an acquaintance.     
 
  Name/Nickname                                      Sex             Age 
 
7. ___________________________                   ________    _________ 
 
___ I know this person extremely well.   
___ I do not know this person extremely well, but he/she is more than an “acquaintance.” 
___ This person is an acquaintance.   
 
 








Items taken from the 20-Item International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) NEO Neuroticism 
Domain Scale 
1. Often feels “blue” (positive indicator)    
2. Seldom gets mad (negative indicator) 
3. Not easily frustrated (negative indicator) 
4. Has frequent mood swings (positive indicator) 
5. Panics easily (positive indicator) 
6. Rarely gets irritated (negative indicator) 
7. Remains calm under pressure (negative indicator) 
8. Feels comfortable with himself/herself (negative indicator) 
9. Fears for the worst (positive indicator) 
10. Feels threatened easily (positive indicator) 
 
General Definitions 
11. Emotionally unstable 
12. Sensitive, emotional and prone to experience feelings that are upsetting 
13. Prone to psychological distress 
 
 










Attribute Total Violations Possible Violations Transitivity Index 
1 1650 7672 .21 
2 1767 7672 .23 
3 1764 7672 .23 
4 1640 7672 .21 
5 1561 7672 .20 
6 1836 7672 .24 
7 1559 7672 .20 
8 1795 7672 .23 
9 1657 7672 .21 
10 1842 7672 .24 
Definition    
1 1776 7672 .23 
2 1763 7672 .23 





Summary of Individual Transitivity Indices:  All Subjects 
 
Attribute Minimum Maximum Median Mode Mean SD 
1 .00 .61 .20 .21 .22 .15 
2 .00 .61 .21 .71 .24 .16 
3 .00 .61 .20 .14 .23 .15 
4 .00 .63 .20 .16 .22 .15 
5 .00 .64 .18 .14 .21 .14 
6 .00 .64 .24 .18 .24 .14 
7 .00 .66 .18 .89 .21 .15 
8 .00 .59 .21 .00 .24 .16 
9 .00 .63 .18 .14 .22 .15 
10 .00 .66 .23 .71 .25 .16 
Definition       
1 .00 .57 .21 .11 .24 .15 
2 .00 .64 .20 .18 .23 .16 
3 .00 .64 .18 .89 .21 .16 
Total .50 .55 .22 .17 .23 .11 
 





Summary of Individual Transitivity Indices:  Males 
 
Attribute Minimum Maximum Median Mode Mean SD 
1 .00 .48 .18 .18 .22 .15 
2 .00 .59 .19 .59 .26 .18 
3 .00 .59 .27 .27 .29 .14 
4 .36 .63 .16 .16 .21 .15 
5 .36 .54 .16 .11 .23 .15 
6 .00 .54 .27 .29 .26 .15 
7 .18 .61 .13 .11 .18 .15 
8 .00 .57 .27 .30 .26 .17 
9 .18 .63 .18 .23 .22 .16 
10 .18 .54 .24 .43 .25 .15 
Definition       
1 .36 .52 .21 .11 .23 .13 
2 .00 .57 .21 .34 .25 .16 
3 .00 .59 .20 .23 .23 .15 
Total .06 .52 .20 .20 .24 .11 
 





Summary of Individual Transitivity Indices: Females 
 
 
*Note: N = 108 
Attribute Minimum Maximum Median Mode Mean SD 
1 0 .61 .20 .21 .22 .15 
2 .18 .61 .21 .71 .23 .15 
3 0 .61 .18 .14 .22 .14 
4 0 .61 .21 .71 .22 .14 
5 0 .64 .18 .25 .20 .14 
6 .18 .64 .22 .18 .24 .14 
7 0 .66 .18 .23 .21 .14 
8 0 .59 .21 .11 .23 .15 
9 0 .61 .18 .18 .22 .15 
10 0 .66 .23 .25 .24 .15 
Definition       
1 0 .57 .21 .11 .24 .15 
2 0 .64 .20 .18 .23 .16 
3 0 .64 .18 .98 .21 .17 























*Note:  No Self = triplets in which “Myself” was not included (N = 4704); Self = triplets in which 
“Myself” was included (N = 2835); All c-values = .00 based on 500 randomizations. 
 
 Transitivity Index Proportion 
Attribute No Self Self No Self Self 
1 .21 .23 1.00 .98 
2 .22 .25 1.00 .97 
3 .23 .25 1.00 .98 
4 .21 .23 1.00 .98 
5 .20 .23 1.00 .97 
6 .23 .27 1.00 .96 
7 .20 .21 1.00 .99 
8 .22 .26 1.00 .96 
9 .21 .24 1.00 .97 
10 .23 .27 1.00 .96 
Definition     
1 .25 .25 1.00 1.00 
2 .25 .25 1.00 1.00 






Analysis:  Sex and 
Age Congruent 






















*Note:  Incon = sex and/or age incongruent triplets (N = 6430); Con = sex and age incongruent 
triplets (N = 1109);  All c-values = .00 based on 500 randomizations. 
 
 Transitivity Index Proportion 
Attribute Incon Con Incon Con 
1 .23 .23 1.00 1.00 
2 .24 .24 1.00 1.00 
3 .25 .25 1.00 1.00 
4 .27 .26 1.00 .99 
5 .22 .22 1.00 1.00 
6 .25 .25 1.00 1.00 
7 .20 .22 1.00 .98 
8 .22 .27 1.00 .95 
9 .27 .25 1.00 .98 
10 .25 .28 1.00 .97 
Definition     
1 .28 .27 1.00 .99 
2 .27 .27 1.00 1.00 






Analysis:  “Best 
Case Scenario I” 





















*Note:  Best Case I = self-included triplets, matched with respect to sex and age (N = 594); Not 
Best Case = triplets not satisfying the Best Case I criteria (N = 6946); All c-values = .00 based on 
500 randomizations. 
 Transitivity Index Proportion 
Attribute Not Best 
Case 
Best Case I Not Best 
Case 
Best Case I 
1 .22 .22 1.00 1.00 
2 .23 .26 1.00 .97 
3 .23 .30 1.00 .93 
4 .21 .30 1.00 .91 
5 .21 .22 1.00 .99 
6 .24 .29 1.00 .95 
7 .21 .23 1.00 .98 
8 .24 .29 1.00 .95 
9 .22 .26 1.00 .96 
10 .24 .29 1.00 .95 
Definition     
1 .23 .26 1.00 .97 
2 .23 .27 1.00 .96 






Analysis:  “Best 
Case Scenario II” 





















*Note:  Best Case II= self-included triplets in which all people are matched for age and sex and 
the two non-self ratees are extremely well-known (N = 389); Not Best = all remaining triplets (N 
= 7150); All c-values = .00 based on 500 randomizations. 
 Transitivity Index Proportion 
Attribute Not Best Best Case II Not Best Best 
Case II 
1 .22 .22 1.00 1.00 
2 .23 .26 1.00 .97 
3 .23 .30 1.00 .93 
4 .21 .30 1.00 .91 
5 .21 .22 1.00 .99 
6 .21 .23 1.00 .98 
7 .24 .29 1.00 .95 
8 .24 .29 1.00 .95 
9 .22 .26 1.00 .96 
10 .24 .29 1.00 .95 
Definition     
1 .23 .26 1.00 .97 
2 .23 .27 1.00 .96 






Proportion of Rank Matches on Broad Neuroticism Definitions:  All Subjects 
 
 Minimum Maximum Median Mode Mean N 
Definitions 1 & 2 0.00 .75 .25 .25 .29 .17 
.Definitions 1 &3 0.00 1.00 .25 .125 .32 .20 
Definitions 2 & 3 0.00 .875 .25 .25 .29 .19 
All 0.00 .50 .125 .125 .15 .14 
 





Proportions of Rank Matches on Broad Neuroticism Definitions by Sex 
 
 *Note:  N for Males = 31
Males Minimum Maximum Median Mode Mean SD 
Definitions 1 & 2 .00 .625 .25 .25 .29 .14 
Definitions 1 & 3 .00 1.00 .25 .25 .30 .20 
Definitions 2 & 3 .00 .875 .25 .375 .29 .20 
All .00 .375 .125 .125 .14 .12 
Females       
Definitions 1 & 2 .00 .75 .25 .125 .29 .18 
Definitions 1 & 3 .00 .875 .31 .125 .33 .20 
Definitions 2 & 3 .00 .75 .25 .25 .29 .18 





Proportional Analysis of Match Count by Sex 
 
 Definitions 1 & 2 Definitions 1 & 3 Definitions 2 & 3 All Definitions 
Matches Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
0 .03 .06 .07 .07 .13 .09 .32 .29 
1 .20 .28 .19 .24 .19 .24 .32 .35 
2 .35 .23 .35 .19 .26 .29 .26 .21 
3 .26 .20 .23 .18 .26 .15 .10 .10 
4 .10 .14 .10 .20 .10 .17 .00 .04 
5 .03 .08 .00 .07 .00 .04 .00 .00 
6 .00 .01 .03 .04 .03 .03 .00 .00 
7 .00 .00 .00 .01 .03 .00 .00 .00 
8 .00 .00 .03 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Proportion 1.00 .79 1.00 .76 1.00 .82 1.00 .93 
C-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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